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 This paper analyses the factors which influenced the Bank of England’s liquidity ratio 
from January 1, 1876 to the end of 1913. The liquidity ratio is defined as the ratio of gold and 
silver holdings to banknotes issued by the Bank of England and it is also called the 
"Proportion". A key aspect of the gold standard, as this period is called, was the legal 
obligation on the part of Central Banks to convert on request banknotes into gold. From this 
obligation resulted the “discipline” imposed on governments and Central Banks at the time. 
The minimum gold cover of notes outstanding was established by law and varied from 
country to country. As Central Banks could not let the gold cover of notes issued fall below 
the legally established minimum, it is clear that the ratio of gold to notes was constantly 
monitored, leading to apprehension when it was falling rapidly and or approaching the legal 
minimum and to a relaxed attitude when it was increasing.  
 The Central Banks had a very powerful instrument at their disposal to stop the ratio 
from falling and invert its decline. This instrument was the discount rate, which was the 
interest rate they applied on their lending to commercial banks and to the public2. An increase 
in the discount rate attracted in the first place capital flows and gold from abroad, thus 
contributing to increase the Central Bank’s gold stock. It also reduced the demand for 
                                                          
1 This paper is based on a Laurea Dissertation presented on July 7, 1997 by Piera Bignetti at the Università di 
Brescia entitled “Le determinanti del tasso di sconto inglese durante il tallone aureo (1876-1913). Un’analisi 
econometrica” and written under the supervision of the first author. We thank Hannah Nielsen for research 
assistance. 
 
2 At that time the Bank of England was also operating as a commercial bank. 
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rediscounting at the Bank and the level of economic activity in the country, thus reducing the 
stock of banknotes outstanding. Hence both the numerator and the denominator of the ratio 
would move in the right direction.  The analysis of the determinants of the liquidity ratio is 
therefore crucial to understand the objectives of monetary policy during the classical gold 
standard to the extent that its changes caused  changes in the discount rate and changes in the 
discount rate  were the main instrument to control the liquidity ratio.  
 The discount rate was the most important instrument of monetary policy during the 
classical gold standard. A second instrument were the changes in the criteria for admission to 
rediscounting by commercial banks and of borrowing by the non-banking private sector 
which at that time had also access to Central Bank credit. The third instrument was the use of 
so-called gold devices3 which changed the conditions of gold shipments abroad and hence the 
width of the band around the gold parity within which the market exchange rates fluctuated.  
 For the period from 1880 to 1913 Bloomfield (1959) showed graphically for a large 
number of gold standard Central Banks that there was an inverse correlation between the 
annual discount rate and the liquidity ratio. Goodhart (1972) used a more sophisticated 
approach to study the link between the official discount rate of the Bank of England and her 
liquidity ratio. Finally Sommariva and Tullio (1987) analysed the factors which influenced 
the Reichsbanks’ decisions to change the official discount rate from 1876 to 1913 using data 
which refer to each discount rate change enacted by the Reichsbank. These data are contained 
in a rather rare volume published in 1925 in Berlin by the German Imperial Printing Office 
and entitled “Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik” (1925) (henceforth: VN). They cover four 
gold standard countries (Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Austria-Hungary), using 
the same criteria for all four countries and contain, besides discount rates and liquidity ratios, 
also data on exchange rates and private (commercial bank’s) discount rates. 
 Sommariva and Tullio (1987), who were the first to use the data from VN, conclude  
that the differential between the private discount rate in Berlin and the official discount rate of 
the Reichsbank, a measure of “the tension” on the Bank’s gold stock, is a very significant 
determinant of changes in the liquidity ratio. They show that the effect is negative and offer 
explanations of why this should be so. Finally they show that in Germany the effects of the 
liquidity ratio on the Reichsbank’s discount rate and of the differential on the liquidity ratio 
were significantly different between the sub-period 1876-1895 and the sub-period 1896-1913. 
                                                          
3 Gold devices were used by Central Banks to avoid sales and exports of gold and/or to make these operations 
more costly to the private sector.  They consisted in raising the sales price of gold, moving the delivery of gold 
to places distant from the border, delivering minted national coins instead of ingots, and increase the interest 
rates on lending to gold exporters in order to increase transaction costs. 
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 In this paper on the Bank of England we also focus on the differential between the 
average discount rate on lending by major commercial banks in London and the official Bank 
of England’s discount rate (henceforth called “the differential”) as the main explanatory 
variable of the Proportion. However, we include among the explanatory variables also foreign 
discount rates and the deviations of the Pound from the gold parity recorded in the other main 
financial centres. The inclusion of foreign variables allows us to study the extent to which the 
London financial market and the Bank of England’s liquidity ratio were influenced by 
financial conditions  abroad and which were the most important gold standard countries 
influencing London. In addition we can study how the degree of international financial 
market integration changed from 1876 to 1913 and if there were periods during which the use 
of gold devices by the Bank of England and/or other gold standard Central Banks 
significantly changed the coefficients of the estimated relationships.  
 In this paper we use the data from VN. Their main advantages are that they are 
available for the whole period from January 1, 1876 to 1913 and that they provide the same 
data set for four gold standard countries and this makes meaningful international comparisons 
possible. In this paper we also present stability tests of the estimated regressions in order to 
gain insights into how the working of the gold standard changed during the 38 year period. 
 The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 presents the model explaining the changes 
in the Bank of England’s liquidity ratio taking into account international influences. Section 2 
describes in detail the data used and how the variables have been constructed. Section 3 
presents the estimates of the model for the whole period and for the two sub-periods 1876-
1895 and 1896-1913. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
1. The model 
In this section we present an equation explaining the changes in the Bank of England’s 
liquidity ratio. Following Sommariva and Tullio (1987), it is assumed that changes in the 
liquidity ratio depend on the differential between the private and the official discount rate in 
London. However, in order to test how the degree of international financial market integration 
changed through time and to verify the assumption of bi-polarity or multi-polarity of the 
classical gold standard, a set of variables capturing international influences (market exchange 
rates and foreign official discount rates) was included among the explanatory variables. 
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where il∆  denotes a change in the liquidity ratios of the Bank of England. We shall use 
a narrow )1i( =  and a broad definition )2i( = . The first is the ratio of the gold and silver 
stock to banknotes issued by the Bank of England )l( 1 , and the second  has the same 
numerator but includes in the denominator sight liabilities in addition to banknotes issued 
)l( 2 . ∆  stands for a change of the variable. In this case ∆  does not denote the usual 
difference operator, since in our data set the changes refer to differently spaced time points. 
The residuals are denoted by u. 
E
P ii −  denotes the differential between the private discount rate in London and the Bank of 
England’s discount rate. The superscript  E  stands for England. 
ji∆  denotes changes in the discount rate of country j, where the superscript Dj =  stands for 





j e/)ee(w −=  denotes percentage deviations of the market exchange rate of the British 
Pound with the currency of country  j  with respect to the gold parity; the asterisk indicates 
the gold parity and the variable “ je ” the market exchange rate. The gold parity never changed 
during the whole period for Great Britain, Germany and France.   
 Equation (1) states that the main domestic determinant of changes in the liquidity ratio 
is the differential which reflects the situation of the domestic business cycle and the liquidity 
position of the British and in particular the London financial market. The differential must 
have had very high informative contents for the markets and the monetary authorities4. An 
increase in the differential put the Bank of England under strain as it led to an increased 
demand for rediscounting on the part of commercial banks and increased demand for 
banknotes, gold and Bank of England credit by the private sector and hence led to a fall in the 
liquidity ratio.  
 The channels between the business cycle and the liquidity ratio or its components have 
been studied by Goodhart (1972) for the United Kingdom, McGouldrick (1984) and 
Sommariva and Tullio (1987) for Germany. Unfortunately, we cannot introduce the business 
cycle into this model because we have no data on industrial production and GDP comparable 
to those of VN.  
                                                          
4At that time data on GDP and industrial production were not available. 
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 In addition to the differential, changes in the liquidity ratio are assumed to be influenced 
by foreign discount rate changes and deviations of market exchange rates from the gold 
parity. The expected signs of the coefficients of the explanatory variables are: negative for the 
differential, negative for changes in foreign official discount rates and positive for the 
deviation of the exchange rate from the gold parity. The exchange rate is defined as the 
number of foreign currency units (Reichsmark, French Franc and Austrian Florin/Krone) for 
one unit of domestic currency; hence an increase in je  indicates an appreciation of the British 
Pound (capital and gold inflows from abroad).  
 For the exact definition of the variables and for the time intervals over which their 
changes are measured see Section 2. Suffice to mention here that the series used are not 
equidistant time series but they refer to timely ordered episodes of all official discount rate 
changes which occurred during the period. From 1876 to 1913 the Bank of England changed 
the official discount rate 221 times.  
 
 
2. Description of the data used for estimation 
 The VN data used in this paper are obtained from a 1925 volume published by the 
German Imperial Printing Office entitled “Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik: Organisation 
und Geschäftsverkehr Europäischer Notenbanken, 1876-1913”. This two-volume publication 
contains monthly and annual financial data for seven European countries: Austria-Hungary, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Holland, the United Kingdom and Russia. For four countries: 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Austria-Hungary there are more detailed tables 
containing a wealth of data relating to each official discount rate change. For Great Britain the 
relevant table is Table 135 (pages 248 to 255 of Vol. 2). In order to facilitate the description 
of the data we reproduce in Table 1 the columns of Table 135 used in the empirical work 
together with the data for a limited number of episodes of discount rate changes. 
 The one and a half page long introduction to this set of tables contains the following 
sentence: “These tables represent an attempt to explain with a purely numerical methodology 
those factors taken into consideration in deciding changes in the discount rate at the time the 
changes were enacted. These factors were the balance sheet of the Central Bank on the days 
prior to the change, confronted with another balance sheet chosen on purpose by the 
compilers of the table (italic our addition), the foreign exchanges and some foreign discount 
rates” (VN, page 238). This sentence and the data description which follow go a long way in 
explaining what the German compilers were aiming at. They certainly knew very well, long 
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before these concepts became current, what a reaction or an objective function of a Central 
Bank is. 
 The first column in Table 1 contains the month, day, and year of the official discount 
rate change. The second column contains the date of the closest statement of the Bank of 
England used by the compilers of the table, and possibly also by the members of the Board at 
the meeting during which the discount rate change was decided5, to analyse the factors which 
led to the decision to change the discount rate. The date of the closest statement generally 
precedes the day of the discount rate change by one day. In 6 cases out of 221 the date of the 
closest statement follows the day of the discount rate change by one or two days. The third 
column contains the date of a more distant statement, generally preceding the day of the 
discount rate change by 2 weeks to 2 months and on some occasions by more. The interval 
between the two statements was chosen by the compilers of the table. In choosing these 
reference intervals the compilers were interested in eliminating disturbances to the balance 
sheet items of the Bank caused by seasonal factors or special events. For the whole period the 
average interval between the two statements was 50.0 days. The interval fell from 58.7 days 
in the period 1876-1895 to 36.9 days in the period 1896-19136. 
 Columns 4 and 5 contain the changes in the narrow and broad definition of the liquidity 
ratio between the two dates reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 1. 1l  is defined as the ratio 
between the gold and silver stock of the Bank of England to banknotes issued by her. 2l  is 
defined as the ratio of the gold and silver stock of the Bank of England to the sum of  
banknotes issued  and sight liabilities. 
 
 
                                                          
5This is our supposition.  
6The significant reduction observed from the first to the second period in the reference interval may be an 
indication that the Bank of England was operating the gold standard on a “thinner” gold stock and/or that it was 
managing the system in a more efficient way. This large reduction observed for the Bank of England stands in 




Table 1:  Discount rate changes of the Bank of England, 1876 – 1913. Some representative data at the beginning of the period. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 































1 1/6/1876 1/5/1876 12/29/1875 -3.2 -4.4 0.75 20.66 25.43 11.60 1.0 0.0 0.0 
2 1/27/1876 1/26/1876 1/5/1876 7.5 14.3 -1.125 20.59 25.43 11.75 -1.0 0.0 0.0 
3 3/23/1876 3/22/1876 1/5/1876 18.6 17.7 -0.625 20.70 25.50 11.83 -2.0 0.0 -0.5 
4 4/6/1876 4/5/1876 1/5/1876 17.0 16.6 -0.625 20.71 25.48 11.94 -2.0 0.0 -0.5 
5 4/20/1876 4/19/1876 1/5/1876 18.5 19.1 -1.125 20.68 25.48 12.30 -2.0 0.0 -0.5 
6 5/3/1877 5/2/1877 3/14/1877 -11.9 -8.7 1.00 20.64 25.30 13.13 0.0 -1.0 0.0 
7 7/5/1877 7/4/1877 5/2/1876 7.7 5.1 -1.00 20.66 25.35 12.81 1.0 0.0 0.0 
8 7/12/1877 7/11/1877 7/4/1877 2.5 3.4 0.625 20.63 25.30 12.84 0.0 0.0 0.0 
9 8/28/1877 8/29/1877 7/25/1877 -5.3 -3.1 1.00 20.64 25.30 12.25 0.0 0.0 0.0 
10 10/4/1877 10/3/1877 8/29/1877 -8.1 -6.8 0.875 20.68 25.30 11.98 1.5 0.0 0.0 
11 10/11/1877 10/10/1877 8/29/1877 -9.3 -8.4 0.75 20.70 25.40 12.18 1.5 0.0 0.0 
12 11/29/1877 11/28/1877 10/10/1877 6.7 11.5 -1.375 20.70 25.35 12.16 -0.5 0.0 0.0 
13 1/10/1878 1/9/1877 10/10/1877 8.4 4.1 -1.25 20.63 25.35 12.20 -1.0 0.0 0.0 
14 1/31/1878 1/30/1978 1/9/1878 3.7 5.0 -1.00 20.57 25.33 12.50 -0.5 0.0 0.0 
 
Source: Table 135 of VN 
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 Column 6 contains the differential between the average private discount rate of major 
commercial banks in London and the official discount rate of the Bank of England on the day 
prior to the discount rate change. It is worth mentioning that in VN this differential is called 
“the tension” (Spannung in German).  
 Columns 7 to 9 contain exchange rates on the day before the discount rate change. 
Column 7 reports the number of Reichsmark per Pound in Berlin, column 8 the number of 
French Francs per Pound in Paris and column 9 the number of Florins/Kronen per Pound in 
Vienna. In order to obtain the percentage deviations of the market exchange rates from gold 
parity, we used the gold parities reported in Gallarotti (1995). They are: 20.430 Reichsmark 
per Pound and 25.225 French Francs per Pound.  For Austria-Hungary a gold parity of the 
Pound in Vienna was set only in 1892. It is 24.018 Kronen per Pound. However, because the 
Austro-Hungarian currency continued to fluctuate substantially until 1895, it makes sense to 
define a deviation of its market exchange rate from parity only starting in 18967.  
 Changes in the official discount rates in Germany )i( D∆ , France )i( F∆  and Austria-
Hungary )i( A∆  are not reported in Table 135 of VN. For their construction, we had to use 
information contained in the other tables of VN. As for these three foreign countries, VN 
contains daily figures of the official discount rate for the whole period 1876-1913, we 
calculated for each of the 221 episodes of changes in the Bank of England’s discount rate the 
corresponding changes in the three foreign official discount rates over the interval between 
the date of column 3 of Table 1 and the day before the discount rate change. 
 To summarize four observations are in order. First, the data presented in Table 1 can be 
divided into four main categories:  A.  For each discount rate change information on the 
balance sheet items of the Bank of England, in other words on her assets and liabilities, on 
two reference days. B.  The differential between the private discount rate of major 
commercial banks in London and the discount rate of the Bank of England on the day prior to 
the discount rate change. C.  The market exchange rates with reference to two main foreign 
currencies on the day preceding the change in the discount rate. D. The changes in foreign 
official discount rates.  
 Second, the series contained in each column are not equally spaced chronologically 
ordered data; hence the frequency of the data is variable depending on the time elapsed 
between one discount rate change and the next. 
                                                          
7 For an overwiew of the monetary developments in Austria-Hungary during this period see Flandreau (2003) 
and Tullio and Wolters (2004). 
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Third, there is virtually no degree of discretion on our part in the way the series were 
constructed. How they were constructed follows logically from a careful analysis of Table 
135 in VN. Fourth, the compilers of the table were not just statisticians, they were economic 
historians writing a history of the gold standard in numbers. We presume that they must have 
had substantial inside information on how decisions were taken and on how the system was 
actually working. They may have written the book with some degree of longing for stability 
in international monetary matters which in 1925 was nowhere near in sight. They may have 
written it with the same spirit which guided Egyptian scholars in the third and second 
centuries BC to write down as much as they could about a disappearing culture8. 
By estimating equation (1) with the data presented in this section we make use of an 
incredible wealth of information which has never been used before to study the determinants 
of the Bank of England’s liquidity ratios.  
 
 
3  The determinants of changes in the Bank of England’s liquidity ratios 
 In this section we present ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (1) which 
includes exchange rates and foreign discount rates among the explanatory variables. We 
started out with all explanatory variables in the regression and then eliminated successively 
all non significant ones. The program used was Eviews 4.0. Table 2 contains the estimates of 
equation (1) for the whole period and for both definitions of the liquidity ratio and Table 3 
contains the estimates for the sub-periods 1876-1895 and 1896-1913.  
 The important role played by the differential between the London private discount rate 
and the official one has been explained in Section 1. The key role played by this variable is 
strongly confirmed by the regression results9. It is by far the most significant variable. Its 
negative sign indicates that the higher the differential (the higher the “tension” that was allowed 
to accumulate) the higher were the incentives for commercial banks to seek rediscounting at the 
Bank of England. Similarly, the higher was the differential, the higher were the incentives both 
for firms and individuals, which at that time had access to Bank of England credit, to borrow 
                                                          
8Most of the written Egyptian documents concerning the Egyptian culture date from these last centuries. 
9 A few words are in order concerning the days on which the compilers of VN reported the tension and the final 
day of the period over which the changes in the liquidity ratio are measured (reference period). In 2 out of 221 
cases the tension is measured one day after the end of the reference period.  For regressions with time series the 
explanatory variables should normally not be measured at a date later than the date of the dependent variable. 
We do not think that this constitutes a problem in our case mainly because the differential measures the 
accumulation of tensions over a time span which may be as long as or even longer than the reference interval. In 
addition if the reference period is generally one to two months long, a one day lead of the differential do not 
matter. Finally this anomaly occurs only in two cases out of 221. 
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from her rather than from commercial banks. As a consequence the Bank of England experienced 
under such circumstances an increase of her banknotes outstanding and of her short term 
liabilities and a fall in her metal stock, all leading to a fall in the liquidity ratio. Furthermore it has 
been shown that in gold standard countries the demand for banknotes and gold coins by the 
private sector was moving pro-cyclically (McGouldrick, 1984, Sommariva and Tullio, 1987), that 
the liquidity ratio was moving anticyclically (Goodhart, 1972) and that the differential was 
moving pro-cyclically (Sommariva and Tullio, 1987). Hence it is plausible to assume that the 
high significance of the coefficient of the differential in the regressions of Table 2 catches also 
the effects of the business cycle on the items which appear in the numerator and the denominator 
of the liquidity ratio, besides substitution effects between the private sector’s sources of 
borrowing (the Bank of England versus commercial banks). A one percentage point 
 
Table 2:  The determinants of the British liquidity ratios 
Period 1876 – 1913 (T = 221) 
 
 (1) (2) 






p ii −  -10.083 (12.8) 
-5.585 
(11.2) 








2R  0.492 0.488 
DW 1.87 1.97 
AIC 7.400 6.494 


















Absolute values of the t-statistics are given in parantheses, p-values in brackets.  DW denotes 
the Durbin-Watson statistic.  Q(10) denotes the Box-Pierce Portmanteau statistic with 10 lags 
to test for white noise in the residuals.  HET is the White test for heteroskedasticity in the 
residuals.  The RESET test tests against specification errors.  The Akaike (Schwarz) informa-
tion criterium is denoted as AIC (SC).  
 12
(100 basis points) higher differential led on average to a fall of about 10.1 percentage points in 
the narrowly defined liquidity ratio and of about 5.6 percentage points in the broadly defined one. 
These numbers are a clear indication of how sensitive the liquidity ratios were to the differential.  
As to foreign variables, only changes in the Reichsbank’s discount rate and deviations 
of the Reichsmark from gold parity are significant. No other country significantly influenced 
the Bank of England’s liquidity ratios. However, when we split the period we find that 
Austria-Hungary significantly influenced both liquidity ratios in the first period. We shall 
discuss the influence of Austria-Hungary on British liquidity ratios in connection with Table 
3 below.  
 The German official discount rate was exerting a significant and negative influence on 
both British liquidity ratios. However, its effect on the broadly defined liquidity ratio was 
much more significant.  The fact that the significance of Di∆  on 2l∆  is much higher than on 
1l∆  has a very interesting implication: the sight liabilities of the Bank of England, consisting 
mainly of deposits held probably by big investors, must have been much more sensitive to 
changes in Di∆  than her banknotes outstanding. Big investors are likely to pay greater attention 
than holders of banknotes to conditions prevailing in foreign markets.  
 The exchange rate of the Reichsmark has the expected positive sign. As it is defined as the 
number of foreign currency units per Pound, an increase in its value indicates an appreciation of 
the Pound, and hence presumably a balance of payments surplus, an inflow of gold into Great 
Britain and a rise in the liquidity ratios of the Bank of England. In other words, a strong Pound 
was associated with an improvement in the liquidity position of the Bank of England and 
symmetrically a weak one was worsening her liquidity position. A positive deviation of one 
percentage point from parity led to an increase in the narrowly defined liquidity ratio of 4.6 
percentage points and of the broadly defined one by 2.6 percentage points. Overall the liquidity 
ratios were about half as sensitive to developments in the foreign exchange market as to 
developments of the differential. 
 The significant effect of the exchange rate of the Reichsmark and of the German official 
discount rate on British liquidity ratios suggest that the classical gold standard was a bi-polar or 
multi-polar system with Berlin also playing an important role. 
 The Adjusted R2s confirm the good descriptive capacity of the model which explains about 
50% of the variability of changes in the liquidity ratios. This is quite high considering the high 
variability of the dependent variables and the fact that they are changes.  
 The residuals of the regression using the narrow definition are extremely well behaved. 
They pass all the standard tests reported at the bottom of Table 2. As to the residuals of the 
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regression using the broad definition they do not pass the test of absence of heteroskedasticity 
(White test) at the 5% confidence level and the Box-Pierce test of absence of autocorrelation at 
the 10% level. They pass the other tests. Thus judging from the behaviour of the residuals the 
regression which explains the broad definition is inferior to the one which explains the narrow 
one. This may imply that the stabilization of the narrow liquidity ratio was more important to the 
















































Figure 1: Recursive coefficients and CUSUM of Squares test for regression (1) of Table 2
i -i
 
 The stability tests of the regression which uses the narrow definition as well as the 
recursive parameter estimates are presented in Figure 1. Those referring to the regression using 
the broad definition are shown in Figure 2. The Cusum of Squares test in Figure 1 shows that the 
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estimated regression is unstable at the 5% confidence level as the statistic moves quite early 
outside the 5% confidence interval and stays there for most of the sample period. The recursive 
parameter estimates confirm the instability of this regression and permit us to find its likely cause. 
Figure 1 shows that there is significant parameter instability for all three coefficients. Particularly 
the analysis of the dynamics of the coefficients of Di∆ and of EP ii −  allows us to isolate a period 
going from about the 60th observation to about the 130th observation during which (a) the 
coefficient of the German official discount rate is virtually zero, while before and after it is quite 
high in absolute value; (b) the effect of the differential is significantly higher in absolute value 
than before and after. Overall, during this period we observe a lower influence of Germany, and 
especially of the Reichsbank’s discount rate, on the British liquidity ratio, while at the same time 
the influence of domestic factors is higher. 
 The interval between observations 60 and 130 corresponds to the period between 
November 12, 1885 and September 21, 1893. The observed behaviour of the parameters during 
those years may be explained by the frequent use of the so-called gold devices by the Bank of 
England. Their frequent use on the part of the Bank during this period, and especially in the late 
1880s and in 1891-92, is reported by Sayers (1976) and Scammel (1965). A more intensive use of 
the devices in this period on the part of the Reichsbank could probably also contribute to explain 
the observed behaviour. However, we do not have sufficient evidence on a more intensive use of 
gold devices on the part of the Reichsbank during this period. 
 When sometimes in 1892-93 the Bank of England stopped using gold devices more 
intensively the effect of the German official discount rate on the Bank of England’s liquidity ratio 
became again large and significant and there is correspondingly a significant reduction in the 
absolute value of the coefficient of the domestic explanatory variable (the differential in London). 
This change in roles between domestic and foreign explanatory variables was probably the 
consequence not only of the relaxation of capital controls on the part of the Bank of England but 
also of the greater financial integration between London and Berlin. The latter was also 
stimulated by the improvement in communication technology, a development which contributed 
to make Bank of England’s sight liabilities particularly sensitive to Di∆ . 
 Figure 2 presents the stability tests and the recursive parameter estimates for the regression 
of Table 2 explaining the broad liquidity ratio. The Cusum of Squares test indicates that the 























































of instability as those of the regression explaining the narrow liquidity ratio. However, the 
instabilities are somewhat less pronounced and the effect of the use of gold devices on the 
parameters starts and ends earlier. In addition the coefficient of the German discount rate remains 
significantly different from zero also during the period of more intensive use of gold devices by 
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the Bank of England, probably because the latter’s sight liabilities were more sensitive to foreign 
influences than the stock of her banknotes outstanding. 
 In the light of the observed instabilities we decided to split the sample period into two sub-
periods. Following Sommariva and Tullio (1987) we split the period at the end of 1895. This is 
justified by several historical facts. Among them should be mentioned the end of the long 
period of declining prices in the gold standard world as a result of the discovery of new gold 
mines and of a new process to extract gold and the end, in the late 1880s and early 1890s, of a 
period characterized by the more intensive use of gold devices on the part of the Banque de 
France and the Bank of England. Furthermore, in analysing the coefficient of Di∆  in Figure 1, 
we saw that a break occurred around the 130th observation. This observation corresponds to the 
Bank Rate change of September 21st, 1893. Other important developments to justify the split 
were the improved communication and transportation techniques, the increased degree of 
integration of financial markets worldwide, the increased economic and financial weight of 
Germany and the development of the Pound as an international reserve currency. Certainly, 
all these changes did not occur abruptly on December 31st 1895. However, Chow Break tests 
performed on the Bank of England and Reichsbank’s reaction functions show clearly that this 
is the most suitable date to split the gold standard period in two10. It is also worth noting that 
in 1895 there were no changes in Bank Rate, which contributes to make this year an appropriate 
dividing line. 
 Table 3 contains the estimates of equation (1) separately for the two sub-periods for both 
definitions of the liquidity ratio. The first period corresponds to observations 1 to 133 and the 
second to observations 134 to 221. This still leaves us with a comfortable number of observations 
in each sub-period (133 in the first and 88 in the second). Columns (1) and (2) show the estimates 
for the narrow definition of the liquidity ratio and columns (3) and (4) for the broad one. In both 
sub-periods and for both definitions of the Proportion the London differential is the most 
important explanatory variable, although its significance declines sharply in the second period. 
During the first period the discount rate in Vienna had a significant and negative effect on both 
liquidity ratios. This effect did not show up in the estimates for the whole period (cf. Table 2). 
Vienna was not really on the gold standard until 1902, although it had tried to “shadow” it since 
1896 and although it had been struggling for decades to accumulate enough gold to allow it to 
establish convertibility of its banknotes. During the first period the Austro-Hungarian currency 
underwent large fluctuations. Its exchange rate with the Pound fluctuated within a range of about 
15%. The Austro-Hungarian currency was “speculative” enough to influence the Proportion in 
                                                          
10See Tullio and Wolters 2003a and 2003b. 
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London. In the second period the currency of Austria-Hungary fluctuated much less and then 
eventually joined the gold standard in 1902. As a result the influence of the discount rate in 
Vienna on the London liquidity ratio fell more in line with the economic and financial weight of 
Austria-Hungary in the European context and vanished. 
 
Table 3:  The determinants of the liquidity ratios 
 
Period 1876-1895 
(T = 133) 
1896-1913 
(T = 88) 
1876-1895 
(T = 133) 
1896-1913 
(T = 88) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 































2R  0.690 0.284 0.666 0.257 
DW 1.83 1.75 2.13 2.01 
AIC 6.812 7.897 6.170 6.749 


































Notes:  see Table 2 
 
 Germany had a significant influence on 2l∆  in both periods, whereas its influence on 1l∆  
is restricted to the first period. Taking the narrow liquidity first, the influence of Germany worked 
principally via the deviations of the Reichsmark from parity (regression (1) of Table 3). As to the 
broad definition the effect worked both via the exchange rate and the German discount rate in the 
first period and only via the Reichsbank’s discount rate in the second (regression (4) of Table 3). 
In the first period the economic and financial weight of Germany was still smaller than Great 
Britain’s. However, the fact that Berlin had to consolidate its recent move to the gold standard 
caused relatively large disturbances to the world’s gold and financial markets. In the second 
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period these shocks subsided. However, in the meantime the economic and financial weight of 
Germany had grown enormously with respect to Great Britain’s. The likely cause of the greater 
influence of Berlin on London’s broad liquidity ratio than on the narrow one has already been 
discussed in connection with Table 2. 
 The explanatory power of the regressions falls considerably from the first to the second 
period, suggesting that for the second period some important explanatory variables may be 
missing from our model, such as the increasing weight of the US in the world economy, the 
greater influence on London originating from colonies and developing countries and the 
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Figure 3: CUSUM of Squares test for regressions (1) - (4) of Table 3
regression (1) regression (2)




                                                          
11 Using weekly data Tullio and Wolters (2000) show that the influence of financial conditions in the US on London 




The residuals of regressions (1) and (2) of Table 3, those explaining the narrow liquidity 
ratio, are well behaved and the estimated relationships are stable. At the 5% confidence level both 
regressions pass the Cusum of Squares stability test (see Figure 3). As to regressions (3) and (4), 
those explaining the broad liquidity ratio, the residuals do not pass the Jarque-Bera test of 
normality at the 5% level of significance. However the residuals of the regressions pass the other 
standard tests as shown at the bottom of Table 3 (autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and 
functional form misspecification). In addition the Cusum of Squares test shows that regressions 
(3) and (4) are slightly unstable (Figure 3). 
 
 
4  Summary of main results and conclusions 
 In this paper we present OLS estimates of an equation explaining changes in the Bank 
of England’s liquidity ratios from 1876 to 1913. The changes in the liquidity ratios are 
assumed to depend on the differential between the private and the official discount rate in 
London, on foreign discount rate changes and on deviations of the exchange rates of the 
Pound from gold parity. Two liquidity ratios are used, a narrow and a broad one.  
 We use data referring to all episodes of discount rate changes enacted by the Bank of 
England during the period. Thus the data are “not equally spaced chronologically ordered”. 
Since there were 221 such changes we have 221 observations. The use of these data reduces 
the problems of reverse causation between exogenous and endogenous variables, contrary to 
annual or monthly data which would hide a substantial amount of information. The changes in 
the discount rate within the year were namely frequent and the changes in the liquidity ratios 
large and rapid. We introduce international factors into the model in order to study mutual 
influences among countries and to check whether the classical gold standard was a bi-polar or 
multi-polar system. Finally we present stability tests and split the sample period in order to 
study the changes in the role of the determinants of the liquidity ratios and in the working of 
the gold standard over time. 
 The main findings of the paper are first that throughout the period the differential 
played an important role in transmitting disturbances from the real economy and from the 
London financial market to the Bank of England’s liquidity ratios and ultimately to the 
official discount rate, confirming an hypothesis first advanced by Goodhart (1972) for Great 
Britain.  
 Second, of the three foreign countries considered in this paper, Germany, France and 
Austria-Hungary, only Germany and Austria-Hungary influenced both liquidity ratios of the 
Bank of England. However, the influence of Austria-Hungary was limited to the first period 
 20
and was mainly of a speculative nature, while the influence of Germany was significant in 
both periods. The German influence on the Bank of England's liquidity ratios operated both 
via the Reichsbank discount rate and via the exchange rate of the Reichsmark.  
 Third, the Reichsbank’s discount rate exerted a more significant influence on the 
broad than on the narrow liquidity ratio. The explanation offered is that foreign banks, 
financial institutions and large investors, including German ones, held deposits in London and 
also at the Bank of England. They tended to react more promptly to changes in the German 
official discount rate than holders of Bank of England notes.  
Fourth, the finding of this paper that Berlin significantly influenced London coupled 
with the findings of Tullio and Wolters that London significantly influenced  the discount rate 
in Berlin (2003a), that Berlin influenced Paris almost as much as London (2003c) and that 
Berlin but not London influenced Vienna (2004) imply that the classical gold standard was a 
decentralized multi-polar system (or at least a bi-polar one) as suggested by Eichengreen 
(1992) and Tullio and Wolters (1996, 2000) rather than the system which Keynes (1930) is 
alleged to have had in mind in his well known “conductor of the orchestra” view. 
 Fifth, the relationships estimated for the whole period are unstable. The instability 
results in the first place from significant changes in the coefficients of the differential and of 
the German discount rate. We put these significant changes in relation to a more intensive use 
of gold devices on the part of the Bank of England during the period from about 1885 to about 
1892/93.  
 Sixth, even though the changes in the coefficients of the explanatory variables do not 
occur abruptly, we have argued in the paper that the most appropriate time to split the period 
in two is at the end of 1895. We then estimate all regressions separately for the sub-period 
1876-1895 and for the sub-period 1896-1913 and find that the regressions explaining the 
narrow liquidity ratio, which was the most important for the Bank of England, become stable. 
The same cannot be said for the regressions explaining the broad liquidity ratio. 
 Seventh, by splitting the period, the explanatory power of the estimated equations falls 
significantly from the first to the second period for both definitions of the liquidity ratio. This 
implies that our model is less able to capture all the factors affecting changes in the Bank of 
England’s liquidity ratios in the second period. We argue that this may have to do with the 
development of the Pound as a reserve currency, the increased role of Germany, the US and 
large countries of the British Empire in conditioning the financial market in London and the 
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